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1.1 Specification of Topic and Relevance 
 
Since Norway proclaimed its Continental Shelf around the mainland in 1963,1 the original 
viewpoint of Norway regarding rights of the contracing Parties to the Treaty concerning 
Spitsbergen2 (Svalbard Treaty) is that they do not apply to the continental shelf regime. The 
argument set out by Norway has been that the continental shelf off Svalbard is a natural 
prolongation of the continental shelf of mainland Norway and that the archipelago does not 
generate a shelf itself. However, the development in recent years regarding Norwegian state 
practice indicates that there has been a change in th  Norwegian position. This is of interest to 
investigate as the official Norwegian policy has not changed.  
 The question of the applicability of the Svalbard T eaty to the maritime zones off 
Svalbard has attracted international attention for decades and concerns an unresolved legal 
question regarding the application of the provision f the Svalbard Treaty to the adjacent 
maritime areas. Norway was granted sovereignty overthe archipelago in 1920 by the 
Svalbard Treaty’s Article 1 which is subject to certain stipulations that restrict this 
sovereignty. Article 3 of the Svalbard Treaty provides for equal access to the Archipelago for 
all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations. Article 8 lays down the mining 
regulations and entails restrictions on these such as taxes and dues should be devoted 
exclusively to the Archipelago and not exceed what is required for this need. The Svalbard 
Treaty was signed 9 February 1920 and was designed as an open-access regime, ensuring that 
all states that adhered to the Treaty subsequently would enjoy the rights of non-discrimination 
upon ratification of the Svalbard Treaty.3 As of August 2013, there are 41 contracting parties 
to the Treaty, which among others include The United States, France, Great Britain and 
Russia. The treaty came into force 14 August 1925.
                                                
1 Royal Decree of 31 May 1963 No. 1 Relating to the Sovereignty of Norway over the Sea-Bed and Subsoil 
outside the Norwegian Coast. 
2 Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great 
Britain and Ireland and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th 
February 1920. Reprinted in Annex I. 
3 Ulfstein, Geir (1995) The Svalbard Treaty – From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. p. 51. 
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Since Norway and Russia entered into a delimitation agreement in 2010 (Barents Sea Treaty)4 
the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources has received much attention. Maritime 
areas are of vital importance to Norway as oil and natural gas constitute the state’s number 
one and two export products in 2012.5 According to the 2008 U.S. Geological Survey, the 
continental shelves in the Arctic may comprise the geographically largest unexplored area for 
petroleum and that approximately 84 per cent of the undiscovered petroleum resources in the 
Arctic occur offshore.6 The legal status of the continental shelf adjacent to Svalbard is 
therefore important to investigate as it may potentially contain large petroleum resources. 
Further it is interesting to investigate the legal st tus of the shelf in relation to the 
development in the law of the sea. 
After Russian submarines planted a titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole, a 
media frenzy began suggesting there was a “scramble for the Arctic”.7 Arctic national 
officials, however, did not ascribe it any significance. As the Canadian Foreign Minister 
pointed out, “You can't go around the world these days dropping a flag somewhere. This isn't 
the 14th or 15th century.”8 A legal advisor to the Danish Foreign Ministry noted the event as 
“more [of] a media stunt than anything else.”9 
 Opposed to what the media may think, there exists a common legal framework 
governing activities of the sea. This framework is strongly anchored in the 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)10 which also applies to the Arctic.11 Four of the five 
Arctic States are parties to the LOS Convention,12 only the United States remains to sign it. 
The five Arctic coastal states declared in May 2008 through the Ilulissat Declaration that they 
were committed to the existing legal framework and that the law of the sea “provides for 
important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the 
                                                
4 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean, Murmansk 15 September 2010. 
5 External trade in goods (2012) “Final figures” Statistics Norway. Available at: 
http://www.ssb.no/en/utenriksokonomi/statistikker/muh/aar-endelige (August 2013). 
6 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (2008) “Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle” 
U. S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet, 3049. 
7 See Sale, Richard and Eugene Potapov (2010) The Scramble for the Arctic: Ownership, Exploitation and 
Conflict in the Far North. London: Francis Lincoln Ltd. 
8 Galloway, Gloria and Alan Freeman (2007) “Ottawa Assails Moscow's Arctic Ambition”, The Globe and Mail, 
Aug. 3, 2007, pp. A-1 and 11. 
9 Ibid. 
10 LOSC, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397. 
11 McDorman, Ted L. (2008) “The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 NM: Law and Politics in the Arctic Ocean” 
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy. 18 (2): 155-194. p. 159. 
12 Norway, Canada, Denmark/Greenland and the Russian Federation. 
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continental shelf”13 Currently there are numerous undelimited outer contine tal shelves in the 
Arctic. 
 
1.2 Research Problems 
 
After the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) produced four 
conventions, the continental shelf came into existence as a legal maritime zone. Norway was a 
part of the negotiations but did not accede to the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
(Geneva Convention)14 until 1971. In 1963, Norway proclaimed its sovereignty over the 
continental shelf based on the 1958 Geneva Convention.15 This area included the adjacent 
maritime areas of Svalbard beyond the “territorial w ters” of Svalbard as specified by the 
Svalbard Treaty.16 There is, however, disagreement on the legal basis of the continental shelf 
in the adjacent maritime areas and on the application of the Svalbard Treaty to these areas. In 
1985, an area of the continental shelf around Svalbard was opened up for seismic activity and 
in 1989 the Barents Sea South was opened up for exploration.17 This area extended to 74° 34’ 
North and thus stretched into the contested area of the Svalbard continental shelf. However, 
these problems were not addressed by the Norwegian government before or during the 
process of considering the opening of these areas for exploitation activities.18 
 This thesis aims at uncovering whether the Svalbard Archipelago generates maritime 
zones. Should this be case, the general assumption is that the Svalbard Treaty applies to the 
adjacent maritime zones. The Norwegian position will be discussed in relation to the 
development in the law of the sea. This will constitute the basis for the second question which 
will examine the legal implications of the applicaton of the Svalbard Treaty and its regulatory 
framework to the continental shelf. The conclusion will indicate that the original position was 
based on the law of the sea as it emerged in the 1958 Geneva Convention and that the position 
lacks legal viability according to the new law of the sea and recent state practice. 
                                                
13 Ilulissat Declaration signed at the Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 27-29 May 2008. 
14 Geneva Convention, Convention on the Continental She f, Geneva 29 April 1958. 499 UNTS 311. 
15 Royal Decree of 31 May 1963 No. 1. 
16 Cf. Svalbard Treaty, Art. 2. 
17 Ulfstein (1995) p. 408. 
18 See Report to the Storting No. 40 (1988-1989) on Opening of the Barents Sea South for Exploratory Activity. 
Henceforth referred to as “Report”. All titles and excerpts are unofficial translations from Norwegian. 
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1.3 Sources of International Law and Methodology  
1.3.1 Sources of International Law 
 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute)19 states the most 
commonly accepted sources of international law, which include international conventions, 
custom, principles and judicial decisions. Treaties are considered to be significant instruments 
of cooperation in international law and international relations and are pointed out to be 
indicative as an instrument of change in the relation between states.20 The Svalbard Treaty 
presented such a change in the sense that the Svalbard rchipelago had previously been 
considered to be terra nullius. 
Custom is defined as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”21 The practice 
of states can be established by examining published documents such as newspaper reports, 
government statements made to the press, at international conferences, in meetings of 
international organizations and in official government issues documents, such as the 
Norwegian Reports to the Storting.22 A state’s laws and judicial decisions can also display 
state practice. Treaties can also be evidence of customary law, and bilateral treaties can at 
least prove as evidence of a state’s custom.23 The bilateral delimitation agreements between 
Norway/Svalbard-Denmark/Greenland and Norway/Svalbard-Russia are such examples. 
The Norwegian viewpoint on the legal status of the continental shelf was made evident 
by the 1963 Proclamation and was later codified by Act of 21 June 1963 (Act on Submarine 
Resources).24 The Act relates to the entire seabed considered to be Norwegian, including 
around Svalbard. Norwegian policy on Svalbard has been expressed through a series of 
Reports to the Storting on Svalbard and can also be f und in other reports related to petroleum 
activity. 
                                                
19 ICJ Statue, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946. 
20 Malanczuk, Peter (1997) Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. 7th edn. London and New 
York: Routledge. p. 37. 
21 ICJ Statue Art. 38(1)(b). 
22 Malanzcuk (1997) p. 39. 
23 Ibid. p. 40. 
24 Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to Exploration and Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources. 
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1.3.2 Source Material 
 
There has been a political stalemate in the issues discussed in this thesis and on the subject of 
discussion on whether the Svalbard Treaty applies in waters beyond the territorial sea. The 
dominant literature on this topic is represented by a handful of writers. The Norwegian 
position has through many years been supported by the academic work of Carl A. Fleischer 
which to a large degree has been contended for equally as long by Robin R. Churchill. 
Fleischer has worked for the Norwegian Ministry of F reign Affairs since the 1960s which is 
when the Norwegian viewpoint developed. The many published articles of Fleischer can 
therefore be said to reflect the Norwegian official position.25  
Not much literature exists from the academic fields of international law and 
international politics on Svalbard. The literature found is written in connection with 
occurrences which have repeatedly put the Svalbard issue on the agenda. Today, the 
discussion has yet again reached a stalemate, and therefore little literature has been produced 
on the topic since 2010. Geir Ulfstein’s doctoral thesis of 1995 constitutes one of the most 
extensive works of literature on Svalbard. Ulfstein takes a view that is opposite of the 
Norwegian position alongside Churchill. 
There has not yet been any attempts to reach an agreement or conclusion on whether 
the Svalbard Treaty applies in other maritime zones. This has an effect on the literature 
because without a solution to this issue, there has been no relevance in discussing further what 
the consequences and implications of this would be which is what this thesis aims at.  
 
1.3.3 Methodology  
 
The controversial issues of Svalbard revolve around two questions: does Svalbard generate 
maritime zones and does the Svalbard Treaty apply to the maritime zones of Svalbard. The 
use of literature from current authors has been challenging in the sense that most articles or 
chapter discuss both topics intertwined. In order to discuss the first question it has been 
necessary to isolate the arguments related to this and separate those which belong to other 
topics. It may seem factitious to separate issues that initially are interconnected, but it has 
                                                
25 Churchill, Robin R. (1985) “The Maritime Zones of Spitsbergen” in Butler, William E. (ed.) The Law of the 
Sea and International Shipping: Anglo-Soviet Post-UNCLOS Perspectives. London, New York, Rome: Oceana 
Publications, Inc. p. 195 f. 
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been necessary in order to provide for a clear discussion and to provide and insight which has 
not previously been explored.  
 This thesis therefore employs, to a great extent, he work and writings of current 
authors. It also relies greatly on official Norwegian government issued statements such as the 
Reports to the Storting. This has been used throughout t e thesis in order to provide the 
official Norwegian position on the issues discussed. In cases where national law has 
developed this is also referred to. Furthermore, th most relevant international treaties are 
referred to as to establish the case within the scope of international law.  
 
1.4 The Context of the Law of the Sea 
 
The end of the Second World War represented a change in international cooperation, and the 
United Nations took over the work the League of Nations had previously performed. In 
relation to the law of the sea and the continental she f specifically, the 1945 Truman 
Proclamation26 stands out as the most important change in the devlopment of continental 
shelf claims. The United States claimed by unilateral action the right to exercise jurisdiction 
and control over the continental shelf contiguous to the United States in relation to the 
“world-wide need for new sources of petroleum…” This proclamation represented the first 
claim by a coastal state to the resources of the continental shelf which was outside the scope 
of the territorial sea and represents the subsequent action of state practice claims to offshore 
resources in the decades that followed.27 
 There was a pronounced development of states advancing claims of national 
sovereignty over the submarine areas adjacent to their coast which had the technical term of 
“continental shelves”.28 The continental shelf was to be under the control and jurisdiction of 
the coastal State and eventually a conference to codify the emerging trends was rendered 
necessary. The controversy lied in the breadth of tis territory, an issue which was not 
resolved at this first convention on the law of the sea. The new developments extended the 
area of sovereignty beyond the territorial sea, although the breadth of both the continental 
                                                
26 US Presidential Proclamation No 2667 Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of 
the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Washington 28 September 1945. 
27 It should also be noted that there was also substantial development in the jurisprudence by international courts 
on the subject which contributed to developing substantial customary international law. See e.g. the Corfu 
Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 4 and the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v 
Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116. 
28 Report No. 42 (1959) On Norway’s participation in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 
Geneva from 24 February – 27 April 1958, p. 6. 
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shelf and the “sea territory” remained undefined.29 As mentioned, the controversy did not lie 
in the negotiations of the continental shelf as there were at the time a limited number of states 
that had confirmed natural resources in the subsoil. In fact, the Norwegian representative, Mr. 
Stabell stated during the 9th Ordinary Assembly of the United Nations that Norway did not 
have any petroleum deposits outside its coast and thus enjoyed no direct advantage of the 
proposed rules on the continental shelf.30 
 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
 
This thesis deals with an area to which a great deal of history is attached and it is therefore 
necessary to examine the background and the legal history in order to establish the foundation 
upon which the modern law on Svalbard is based on. The next chapter will duly discuss the 
legal history of Svalbard before providing an overvi w of the establishment and a short 
discussion on the most important provisions of the Svalbard Treaty. The chapter will also 
include a discussion on sovereignty which is a recurr nt issue in the thesis and examine the 
foundation for Norwegian Svalbard Policy.  
 The Norwegian position on the nature of the continental shelf is based on the 
framework of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Contine al Shelf and the third chapter will 
include a discussion on the basis of the Norwegian argument and present factors that speak 
against the original Norwegian position. Based on this, the question of whether Norway’s 
position may have changed will be discussed. 
 The final question will take on an assumption based on the previous chapter that the 
Svalbard regulatory framework applies to the continental shelf and examine coastal state 
jurisdiction in light of this and provide a discussion on the legal implications of the 
application of the Svalbard Treaty and its regulatory framework including mining regulations 
and the principle of non-discrimination. 
                                                
29 The Convention on the Continental Shelf only specified the term of the continental shelf as stretching to a 
depth of 200 metres and beyond this point to where the subsoil allowed for the exploitation of natural resources. 
This naturally depended on the available technology. Cf. Geneva Convention Art. 1.  
30 Report No. 17 (1955) on Norway’s Participation in the 9th UNGA in 1954, p. 97. 
 8 
 9 
2. The History of Svalbard, the Svalbard Treaty and Norwegian Svalbard 
Policy 
 
2.1 Legal History of Svalbard 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
The foundation for human existence on Svalbard has c nged through times, often 
characterized by different and specific occurrences, and a settlement pattern is therefore hard 
to trace.31 The history of Svalbard may be characterized as incoherent32 and there exist 
different theories as to the discovery of the archipelago.33 It is important to look at the way the 
archipelago was managed prior to 1920 in order to map out the processes that led to Norway’s 
accession of Svalbard. The chapter will also examine Norwegian Svalbard policy in order to 
provide a foundation for the discussions in chapter 3 and 4.  
 
2.1.2 The Natural Resources of Svalbard 
 
Svalbard has throughout history been sought to for its natural resources. Prior to 1900, there 
were no permanent settlements, and the main human activity was related to the harvesting of 
such natural resources through hunting, fishing and catch of larger marine animals. After the 
turn of the 20th century coal mining industry emerged, and Svalbard moved from what Arlov 
characterizes as the ‘biological period’ to the ‘industrial period’.34 The commonly accepted 
theory is that Svalbard was discovered in 1596 by William Barentsz on his way to find the 
northern sea route to China.35 Although the Dutch did not colonize the newly discovered land 
area, it was they who laid the foundation for the development on Svalbard throughout the next 
century.36 From the 1600s the catching of whales was the prevailing activity in the waters 
surrounding Svalbard. There was however no question of colonization 
                                                
31 Arlov, Thor B. (1996) “Svalbards historie på langs” Ottar: Til Svalbard?. 210. p. 4. 
32 Reymert, Per K. (1996) “Innledning” Ottar: Til Svalbard?. 210: p. 2. 
33 Ulfstein (1995) p. 33. See also Rudmose-Brown, Robert N. (1919) “Spitsbergen, Terra Nullius” Geographical 
Review. 7 (5): pp. 311-321. 
34 Arlov (1996) p.5. 
35 Mathisen, Trygve (1951) Svalbard i Internasjonal Politikk 1871-1925. Oslo: Aschehoug, cited in Ulfstein 
(1995) p. 34. 
36 Arlov (1996) p. 5. 
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yet as the activities mainly took place during the summer months and there was no 
overwinter. The hunting and catching industry continued throughout the century and in the 
1800s, tourism and other commercial activity began to make a foothold on the archipelago. At 
this stage in the history, European countries were colonizing and acquiring new territories, 
and there was a race for new colonies and natural resou ces. When there was word of the 
existence of coal on Svalbard a “coal rush” started that lasted until the Great War. Many 
companies discontinued their mining operations during this time, but Norway expanded its 
activity due to the lack of coal during the war. This and the work done on strengthening 
Norwegian science interests led to the dominance of Norwegian companies on the 
Archipelago and reinforced Norwegian presence on the Archipelago.37 
 In recent years climate change has facilitated an increased interest and presence in the 
Arctic. Undiscovered petroleum resources expected to be present on the Arctic continental 
shelves could also exist in the Svalbard area which is why the legal status of the continental 
shelf adjacent to Svalbard needs to be established. 
 
2.1.3 Terra Nullius 
 
With the discovery of the Archipelago, a conflict over the exploitation of resources emerged 
between the countries interested in participating in the whaling industry. There were also legal 
disputes over claims of sovereignty over the archipelago and disputes over the freedom of the 
seas. Several states claimed sovereignty, Norway-Denmark being one, claiming the Svalbard 
archipelago was connected to the island of Greenland. E gland opposed this claim as they 
themselves claimed the territory. The Netherlands di  not, however, make any claims, 
although reserved the right to continue its operation of hunting and catching in the area38.  
 Denmark-Norway was the only state that claimed sovereignty over Svalbard in the 
17th century.39 As the coasts of Svalbard became increasingly deplet d of whales, there was 
little activity in the area, and consequently Svalbard did not have any political significance in 
the 18th century. The 19th century thus brought with it the new legal status of terra nullius, or 
“no man’s land”. Terra nullius indicates that sovereignty over the territory may be acquired 
by occupation. There had been several claims to the sov reignty over the Svalbard 
archipelago. However, the states concerned lacked the ability to exercise effective authority 
                                                
37 Berg, Roald (1996) ”Svalbard-traktatens norske forhistorie” Ottar: Til Svalbard?. 210, p. 24. 
38 See Ulfstein (1995) Section 1.4. 
39 Ulfstein (1995) p. 36. 
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and were thus not able to establish a legal basis for their claim, thereby confirming the status 
of terra nullius.40 This legal status kept the opportunity of later accession open. The term must 
not be confused with res communis which indicates a common property to all mankind – such 
as the high seas – which cannot be occupied.  
 The first attempt at a change in the legal status wa  suggested in 1871 when the 
Swedish Foreign Ministry approached a number of state  to inquire about any objections to 
the plan to take possession of the territories for scientific purposes related to the natural 
mineral deposits on the islands. The Russian governm nt vetoed the proposition, and the 
project was postponed indefinitely.41 
 There were a series of conferences from 1910-1920 which sought to come to a 
solution on a management regime of the archipelago. A solution came during the Paris 
Conference in Paris in 1920 which resulted in the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. 
 
2.2 The Svalbard Treaty 
2.2.1 Content of Provisions 
 
The Svalbard Treaty includes the principle of nationalization by granting Norway sovereignty 
while preserving the previous status of terra nullius by providing for non-discriminatory 
principles and by allowing accession to the Treaty by new states and finally, to ensure 
peaceful utilization.42 The right to establish maritime zones derives from the sovereignty of 
the coastal state over a territory. It is thus the sovereignty over the land territory which 
governs the sovereignty over the maritime territories. In the case of Svalbard, there are 
provisions which set restrictions on the exercise of Norwegian sovereignty on the 
Archipelago. The following will discuss the sovereignty of Norway as established by Article 
1 of the Svalbard Treaty and give a short introduction o the stipulations which limit the 
exercise of sovereignty. 
 The nationalization principle is laid down in Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty which  
                                                
40 Caracciolo, Ida (2009) ”Unresolved Controversy: The Legal Situation of the Svalbard Islands Maritime Ar as; 
An Interpretation of the Paris Treaty in Light of UNCLOS 1982”. Paper presented at Durham University 
Conference on The State of Sovereignty, April 2007. p. 4. 
41 Mathisen (1951) p. 31 and Berg (1996) p. 16. 
42 Ulfstein (1995) p. 49. 
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accords Norway sovereignty over the archipelago: “The High Contracting Parties undertake 
to recognize, subject to the stipulations of the present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty 
of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen…” 
 The concept of ‘sovereignty’43 is referred to as the “most glittering and controversial 
notion in the history…of public international law”44 Sovereignty characterizes the 
independence of states and the principle of pacta tertiis applies to the concept of sovereignty 
which provides that states are independent and only bound by laws they consent upon 
themselves.45 It is only the notion of customary international lw that is binding on all states 
without any explicit consent from the sovereign state. Decisions made by foreign states and 
foreign law are not binding on the sovereign state. 
 The Svalbard Treaty expresses the will of the contracting parties to provide Svalbard 
with an “equitable regime, in order to assure their d velopment and peaceful utilization”46 
This objective was achieved through recognizing Norwegian sovereignty. Simultaneously, 
there was created an equitable regime for the activity of non-Norwegian states on the 
archipelago. Thus, the sovereignty Norway has over S albard is full and absolute to the extent 
it is limited by the specific provisions of the Treaty. 
In international law, sovereignty means that a state h s the right to take any measures 
of legislative nature and the enforcement thereof. N rway has the right to do this as long as 
these measures are not excluded by the provisions of the Treaty. The Treaty provisions that 
grant rights to state parties are, however, limited to those rights which are specifically 
mentioned in the Treaty. Fleischer suggests that this means that “the rights of the other parties 
do not comprise other than what appears from the wording of the treaty as understood in 
accordance with ordinary treaty interpretation.”47 He further claims that the rights of these 
states “do not comprise rights which derive from the development of new rules which has 
taken place at a much later stage in legal history.” 48 
Sovereignty over land territory implies that a state has a general right that comprises 
all types of authority and power that are not explicitly excluded from the source of which the 
sovereignty is consolidated in. As a result, the state will normally have the exclusive right to 
                                                
43 For a full discussion on the sovereignty of Norway on Svalbard, see Ulfstein (1995) pp. 81-172 
44 Steinberger, H. (1987) ”Sovereignty” in Bernhard, R. (ed.) Encyclopediaof Public International Law, Vol. 10. 
Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, p. 397. 
45 Vienna Convention on The Law of the Treaties, 23 May 1969. 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 34. 
46 Svalbard Treaty, Preamble. See Annex I. 
47 Fleischer, Carl A. (2007) “The New International Lw of the Sea and Svalbard”. Paper presented at The 
Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters 150th Anniversary Symposium, January 2007. Available at: 
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adopt and enforce laws and regulations within its territory independent of other states as long 
as they remain consistent with the legal principles of the framework of international law. This 
precludes Norway simply enjoying the status as “custodian” or that Svalbard has the status of 
a condominium as suggested by some.49 
The limitations on Norwegian sovereignty pertain to the non-discrimination principle 
of equal access and treatment and restriction on taxation in relation to mining activities. The 
limitations appear in articles 2-9 of the Svalbard T eaty. The preservation of the previous terra 
nullius rights are preserved through the principle of non-discrimination which is especially 
evident in articles 2 and 3 which provide that Treaty parties shall have the right to undertake 
activities in regards to, inter alia, hunting, fishing, maritime, industrial, mining and 
commercial activities. 
The rights accorded to state parties shall be enjoyd n an equal basis by all state 
parties. These rights refer to equal access to waters, fjords and ports of the territories defined 
in Article 1, unimpeded operation of and equal exercis  and practice of maritime, industrial, 
mining and commercial activities.50 The Treaty also grants parties the right to fish and hunt in 
the territories specified by Article 1 and its territorial waters.51 In addition to this, all taxes 
claimed from persons or companies on the archipelago and in the territorial waters should not 
exceed what is needed to cover the needs of the arcipelago.52  
 
2.2.2 Relationship to the Law of the Sea 
 
The law of the sea has changed a great deal since 1920. The breadth of the territorial sea has 
been expanded to 12 nm and the 1982 UNCLOS attributed the coastal state rights to exercise 
their jurisdiction beyond these 12 nm as measured from the baselines of the littoral states. 
These areas include the 200-nm Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf. The law 
of the sea transformed areas which earlier belonged to the High Seas and were subject to the 
freedom of the sea, to a system that was more effective and oriented towards resource 
management and environmental protection.  
As Fleischer argued, there is no limit to the sovereignty of Norway other than those 
regulations provided for in the Treaty. There is also no reason to assume that other states 
                                                
49 See Ulfstein (1995) n. 154 p. 66. 
50 Svalbard Treaty Art. 3. 
51 Ibid. Art. 2. 
52 Ibid. Art. 8, para 2. 
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enjoy extended rights based on the law of the sea beyond those rights provided specifically 
for by the Svalbard Treaty. Norway did not accede to the LOS Convention until 1996 which 
was regarded as cautious action “indicative of a desire to avoid expansion of its sovereignty to 
new maritime areas in a manner that would also lead to the application of the ‘equitable 
regime’…to those zones”53  
 The work on establishing baselines around Svalbard w s not completed until 2001 and 
not until 2003 did they expand their territorial sea from 4 nautical miles to 12, thereby 
establishing a system of low-water baselines.54  
 
2.3 Norwegian Svalbard Policy 
2.3.1 The Discovery of Petroleum Resources 
 
The Barents Sea was early on indentified as an interesting area in terms of petroleum 
exploration, but the expectations for the continental shelf in the Barents Sea were not met.55 
According to the latest report on petroleum activities in general on the Norwegian continental 
shelf it is estimated that there are between 175 and 2460 million  
scm o.e. of undiscovered recoverable oil equivalents in he Barents Sea.56As previously 
described, the Reports to the Storting constitute the official Norwegian policy on relevant 
issues. There have been four reports produced on the subject of Svalbard.  
The Report on Svalbard issued in 1974 was the first of its kind and gave an account of the 
development in terms of legal, administrative and industrial matters. The report also sketched 
out some important lines for future Svalbard policy. The background and initiative for the 
report lies within the significance of ensuring an increased presence of Norwegian 
sovereignty and authority on Svalbard.  
 Although petroleum activities are not widely discused in the first report, it is 
nevertheless pointed out as one of the main factors that since the 1950s contributed to a 
substantial change in the situation of Svalbard: Petroleum discoveries in other Arctic areas 
have contributed to an interest for such opportunities n Svalbard, which in terms of 
                                                
53 Caracciolo (2009) p. 6. 
54 Act of 27 June 2003 No. 57 on Norway’s Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone. Available at The Law of the 
Sea Bulletin No. 54 2004, Section 1. 
55 Report No. 26 (1993-1994) on Challenges and Perspectives for the Petroleum Activity on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf, p. 11. 
56 Report No. 28 (2010-2011) An industry for the future– Norway´s petroleum activities. 
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transportation is relatively better situated than other high arctic areas”57  This development 
further led to an increased interest in nature and environmental protection. The report refers to 
this as the “new multinational phase on Svalbard” because of the many foreign interests in 
petroleum research.58 According to the Royal Decree of 9 April 1965,59 Norwegian and 
foreign companies were in practice equal in regards to awarding exploration and exploitation 
licenses. The Norwegian petroleum industry and the Ministry of Industry were of the opinion 
that Norwegian rights be preferred and that they should have a preferential right to acquire 
licenses in the North.60 Although the Government sought towards establishing itself as a 
strong actor in the North, it would not be possible to commence commercial petroleum 
activity without the knowledge and investments the for ign companies contributed with. 
The report stressed that there were no comprehensive plans for petroleum exploration 
on the archipelago. However, the section on petroleum xploration is mainly devoted to 
exploration onshore and does not mention offshore petroleum activities. In a letter from 
March 21, 1970, the Bergmester for Svalbard informed that there had been a number of 
different investigations for petroleum on Svalbard between 1960 and 1969. Some of these 
investigations had taken place offshore and were mainly exercised by foreign companies.61  
 The middle of the 1980s brought about an increased int rest in the Arctic and can be 
linked with new technology and change in climate which opened up for increased opportunity 
to utilize and develop the region. The Arctic is home to one of the most extensive continental 
shelves in the world, and it was thought to contain l rge amounts of natural resources, in 
which hydrocarbons were given most attention. This indicated a trend towards Norway 
continuing to positioning themselves on Svalbard as a strong industrial player in the Arctic 
while still maintaining a low profile in the light of the political situation. 
Like in the previous reports, the overriding objectives in the report from 2008 are 
claimed to be unchanged.62 The report entails a very brief section on petroleum activities, 
although the issue is referenced in the report.  
In regards to petroleum activities, claims had been made for exploratory drilling. 
According to the Mining Code63 a claim is [normally] a preferential right to the indicated 
                                                
57 Report No. 39 (1974-1975) on Svalbard Part IX. 
58 Report No. 39 (1974-1975) p. 6. See also Report No. 95 (1969-1970) on the Exploration and Exploitation of 
Submarine Natural Resources on the Continental Shelf. 
59 Royal Decree of 31 May 1963 No. 1 Relating to the Sovereignty of Norway over the Sea-Bed and Subsoil 
outside the Norwegian Coast. 
60 Report No. 95 (1969-1970) pp. 15-16. 
61 Letter from Bergmesteren for Svalbard, 21 March 1970, cited in Report No. 95 (1969-1970) p. 24. 
62 Report No. 22 (2008-2009) on Svalbard p. 25. 
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resource. 64  However, the claim does not entail an automatic right to begin operations unless 
they are pursuant to the strict environmental regulations of the Svalbard Environmental Act.65 
The territorial waters surrounding Svalbard are not open to exploration of petroleum which 
coheres with the fact that the Government does not consider exploratory drilling for 
petroleum to be pursuant to the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act.66 The Integrated 
Management Plan also identifies these marine areas to be both highly valuable and 
vulnerable.67 The next section will elaborate on the environmental i itiatives established by 
Norwegian policy. 
 
2.3.2 Environmental Initiatives 
 
An important goal in the Government’s Svalbard policy was to establish its role as a viable 
scientific research actor on the archipelago to contribute to a better understanding of climate 
change.68 Environmental challenges were pointed to as a significa t point in the development 
of Svalbard policy.69 The efforts made towards international actors shows that while 
Norway’s sovereignty was accepted, it still endured challenges which facilitated the need to 
further consolidate its own sovereignty.  
Report No. 40 (1985-1985) on Svalbard pointed out that some of the future changes on 
Svalbard would include an increase in industrial activity, especially in relation to petroleum 
activities. This premonition turned out to be unsuccessful as there had not been any finds 
worth exploiting. At the same time, the coal mining dustry was in a downfall.  
Environmental protection stands out as one of the main issues in the reports on 
Svalbard. Report No. 22 (1994-1995) on Environmental Protection on Svalbard set out the 
two key environmental policies for Svalbard. The first objective has become widely known 
and provides that Svalbard should become known as “one of the world’s best managed 
wilderness areas”70 The other objective clearly states that when enviro mental aspects conflict 
                                                                                                                                              
63 Mining Regulations for Svalbard laid down by Royal Decree of 7 August 1925 as amended by Royal Decree 
11 June 1975. 
64 Mining Code, Ch. II, Section  9.  
65 Report No. 22 (2008-2009) p. 99. 
66 Ibid. pp. 66, 99. Svalbard Environmental Act, Act of 15 June 2001 No. 79 Relating to the Protection of the 
Environment in Svalbard. 
67 See Report No. 8 (2005-2006) on Integrated Management of the Marine Environment of the Barents Sea and 
the Sea Areas off the Lofoten Islands, Section 3.2. See also Report No. 30 (2004-2005) on Opportunities and 
Challenges in the North, pp. 12-13. 
68 Report No. 22 (2008-2009) p. 2.5 
69 Report No. 9 (1999-2000) on Svalbard Section 2.2.3. 
70 Report No. 9 (1999-2000) Section 2.2.6. 
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with others, the environmental aspect shall take precedence. This had direct impact on 
resource exploitation activities in Svalbard as 52 percent of the land areas of the Svalbard 
archipelago were protected as nature reserves and 72 percent of the territorial waters around 
Svalbard were included in these protection measures.71  
In the period between Report No. 22 (1994-1995) and Report No.9 (1999-2000), there 
had been significant changes in the situation, and the latter report entailed a number of 
measures that were later included in the planned follow-up of Report No. 22. In 2002, Act No. 
79 Relating to The Protection of the Environment on Svalbard (Svalbard Environmental Act) 
came into force which reinforced the policy objectives set out by Report No. 22 (1994-1995) 
and No. 9 (1999-2000).  
Another important instrument in managing the environment in the northern maritime 
areas is represented by the Integrated Management Plan. Climate change paves the way for 
new opportunities in the north, and there is an expectation of increase in activities. It is for 
these reasons and the possible impact new activities may have on the environment that 
necessitated the Integrated Management Plan.72  
Now that the foundation for Norwegian policy on Svalbard is established, the next 
chapter will aim at examining the legal basis of the Norwegian argument and the dissenting 
arguments. It will further be discussed whether the Norwegian argument has changed in order 
to uncover whether the Svalbard Archipelago generates its own maritime zones. 
                                                
71 Report No. 9 (1999-2000) Section 6.3.4.  See Annex II for map. 
72 Report No. 22 (2008-2009) pp. 13-14. 
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3. Does Svalbard Generate A Continental Shelf? 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Norwegian claim for jurisdiction on the continental shelf was not necessarily based on 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf as there had been many proclamations 
by other countries without the Geneva Convention as a basis. This was the reason Norway did 
not initially accede to the Convention.73 The legal basis for Norwegian jurisdiction on the 
continental shelf is anchored in the 1963 Proclamation establishing sovereignty over the sea-
bed and subsoil of submarine areas outside the coast of Norway. In the years following the 
Truman Proclamation many states began to establish their sovereign rights over the 
continental shelves adjacent to their coasts.74 The state practice related to claims of 
jurisdiction over continental shelves around the world established that Norway’s proclamation 
was pursuant to general international law.75 However, this formal proclamation is considered 
necessary by neither the 1958 Geneva Convention nor the 1982 LOS Convention.76 The 
reason for making a proclamation was thus to establi h Norwegian authority over of those 
who had interests in the exploitation of the natural resources present on the Norwegian 
continental shelf.77 
 The proclamation was established in Norwegian law by Act of 21 June 1963. Norway 
acceded to and became a State Party to the Geneva Con ention on the Continental shelf in 
1971. The Government White Papers on Svalbard constitute he most substantive legal 
sources that support the Norwegian position.78  
 
                                                
73 Fleischer, Carl A. (1983) Petroleumsrett. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, p. 26. 
74 Rothwell, Donald R and Tim Stephens (2010) The International Law of the Sea. Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd. 
p. 100 ff. See also Young, Richard (1948) “Recent Developments with Respect to the Continental Shelf” 
American Journal of International. 42 (4): pp. 849-857. 
75 Fleischer (1983) p. 27. 
76 Geneva Convention Art. 2.3 and LOSC Art. 77(3). 
77 Fleischer (1983), p. 30. 
78 Churchill, Robin R. and Geir Ulfstein (2010) “The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard” in Nordquist, 
Myron et. al. (eds.) Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea. Leiden : Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 
551-594. n. 33 at p. 564.  
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3.2 An Examination of Viability of the Norwegian Position 
3.2.1 Early development of Norwegian Position 
 
Up until 1962, the issue of exploitation of natural resources under the sea bed was of little 
interest to Norway.79 Prior to this, there had not been any substantial finds of petroleum 
resources on the continental shelf. In 1962 discoveries of substantial size were made on the 
continental shelf in the North Sea, and the question of jurisdiction over the Norwegian 
continental shelf was made current. Although Norway h d participated in the prior 
discussions of the Geneva Conventions, she did not accede to the Treaty until 1971.80  
Norway argues that there is a continuous continental shelf stretching from the 
mainland northern Norway northwards beyond the Svalbard archipelago, and thus they have 
sovereign rights on the continental shelf independently of the Svalbard Treaty.81 
The reports on Svalbard discuss legal issues pertaining to the archipelago. The status 
of the Continental Shelf is not widely discussed in the first report from 1973-1974 despite the 
fact that interest in petroleum activities is pointed out as the main factor that contributed to the 
changing status of the Svalbard archipelago since the 1950s. The increased level of control 
initiated by the Norwegian government in the aftermaths of the report is closely linked with 
their desire to “attend to [their] own national interests”82 Report No. 95 (1969-1970) entails a 
section on Svalbard that clearly indicates that the Government considers the continental shelf 
around Svalbard to be regulated under the general Norwegian law regulating petroleum 
activity.83 The activities related to petroleum exploration and exploitation on Svalbard are 
regulated by Article 8 of the Svalbard Treaty and the appurtenant Mining Code for Svalbard 
and apply “on Svalbard and in Svalbard’s territorial w ters”84 
The second report to the Storting on Svalbard (1985-1986) elaborates on some of the 
legal issues in relation to Svalbard such as the territorial extent of the Svalbard Treaty and 
specifies the legal basis for the continental shelf. According to the report, the Svalbard Treaty 
is not applicable outside the territorial sea limit on basis of the original wording. Further, the 
1963 Proclamation over the continental shelf is applicable for the “continuous continental 
                                                
79 Fleischer (1983) p. 24; Report to the Storting No.17 (1955) p. 97. 
80 See Reports No. 17 (1955) Ch. 4; No.51 (1957) on Nrway’s Participation in the 11th UNGA and in the 1st and 
2nd Extraordinary Assembly in 1956, pp.117-119 and No. 42 (1959). 
81 Report No. 30 (1973-1974) on Activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf etc p. 67. 
82 Report No. 39 (1974-1975) p. 6. 
83 Report No. 95 (1969-1970) pp. 23-25. 
84 Ibid. p. 23. 
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shelf area in […] the Barents Sea, Polar Ocean and the separate shelf area of Jan Mayen”85 By 
describing the Barents Sea and the Polar Ocean as continuous shelves and separating the shelf 
of Jan Mayen, it is clear that Norway considered any ctivities on the continental shelf to be 
outside the scope of the Svalbard regulation framework.  
 
3.2.2 Sovereignty Generates Continental Shelf 
 
Sovereignty is described as an expression of independence and autonomy of a state in the 
relationship with other states. The concept is alsoused to describe the right to exercise 
sovereign rights within a specified area. Norway claims it is this authority that rules in regards 
to natural resources in the territories of Svalbard.86  
 The sovereignty of Norway over Svalbard must be read on the basis of treaty 
interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty. This differs from the normal procedure, where 
sovereignty over a territory is based on customary international law. In addition to the 
foundation of sovereignty as laid out article 1, the current status of Norwegian sovereignty 
can be considered to rest upon the long-lasting exercise of Norwegian administration and 
jurisdiction in the area.87 Norwegian sovereignty is thus undisputed and recognized in 
international law by tacit acceptance.88  
The International Court of Justice has several times referred to this concept that land 
territory dominates the appurtenant maritime zones. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, 
the court stated that “it is the land which confers upon the coastal state a right the waters off 
its coasts.”89 Further, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, it stated that “the rights of the 
coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation 
of its land territory into and under the sea exist ip o facto and ab initio, by virtue of its 
sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it”90 
This close connection between land territory and maritime zones, Churchill and 
Ulfstein argue, suggests that Norway’s rights in the maritime zones around Svalbard are 
subject to limitations.91 This is because the sovereignty Norway exercises ov r Svalbard is 
                                                
85 Report No. 40 (1985-1986) p. 9, Royal Decree (31 May 1963) No. 1. 
86 Report No. 39 (1974-1975) p. 7. 
87 Fleischer (1983) p. 180. 
88 Report No. 22 (2008-2009) p. 20; Churchill (1985) p. 192. 
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90 Ibid. pp. 3 ff. at 23. 
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subject to limitations and since Norway’s right to maritime zones beyond the territorial sea 
derives from its sovereignty over Svalbard.92 Norway on the other hand claims that their 
sovereign right to the resources of the Svalbard Continental Shelf derives from its sovereignty 
over the Norwegian mainland.  
In this view, the continental shelf surrounding Svalbard “belongs” to Northern Norway 
and not Svalbard.93 On the continental shelf, the ordinary petroleum framework for 
exploration and exploitation applies and the Mining Code does not. This follows from the 
1963 Proclamation and 1963 Act on Submarine Resources which establishes that the entire 
Norwegian continental shelf falls under this framework and that the shelf stretches from 
Northern Norway, around and beyond the Svalbard archipelago.94  
Indeed, there is a geologically continuous shelf that stretches northwards from 
northern Norway and the whole sea bed is therefore legally the continental shelf of Norway.95 
However, the geographical continental shelf does not necessarily coincide with the juridical 
continental shelf.  
According to the 200-meter depth criterion of the Gneva Convention the exclusive 
rights of the coastal State over the continental she f goes out to 200 meter of depth or as far 
beyond this limit as the depth of the ocean allows for exploitation of natural resources. 
Geologically, the deepest point between the Norwegian mainland and Svalbard is about 400-
450 meters, and it is reasonable to assume that tody (and in 1983 when Fleischer wrote the 
book upon which this argument is based on) it is possible to exploit resources that are at 500 
meters depth. He argues that it is the exploitation criterion, and not the depth criterion which 
has practical application today.96 The Norwegian regulations on the continental shelf cannot 
be considered to be limited to economic profitability which is why Norway bases its argument 
on the exploitation criterion and not the depth criterion.97 Fleischer claims the only scenario in 
which Norwegian sovereignty based on the mainland did not apply to the continental shelf 
around Svalbard, is if it ratified a treaty which explicitly delimited the continental shelf. As 
long as this does not happen, it is the Geneva Convention and customary international law 
which regulates Norway’s rights on the continental shelf.98  
                                                
92 Churchill and Ulfstein (1992) p. 46. 
93 Churchill (1985) p. 196. 
94 Fleischer (1983) p. 211 f. 
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 Churchill also concludes that the seabed between Northern Norway and Svalbard is 
legally continental shelf, but questions the basis of the Norwegian argument. He points to 
several factors which will be discussed in detail below. Some of these include the issue of 
islands’ entitlement to continental shelves, the inconsistency in the generation of maritime 
zones and last, the use of Svalbard in delimitation between states. 
 
3.2.3 Foundation for Norwegian view 
 
The 1958 Geneva Convention was based on the exploitation principle but also contained the 
distance criterion with a limit of exploitation that stretched to the 200 m isobath or as far as 
the depth of the seabed would allow for exploitation of the resources.99 The International Law 
Commission asserted that the right of coastal states o xercise control and jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf be accepted, but only for the purpose of exploiting the seabed 
resources.100 The issue of maritime delimitation is what brought on the rather broad definition 
of the exploitability criterion which defined the outer limit as “where the depth of superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil.”101 This 
definition was rejected because it might raise disputes in favor of a fixed limit where the sea 
reached a depth of 200 meters.102 The adopted provision was therefore a compound that 
included both the depth criterion and the more flexibl  exploitation criterion. 
 The exploitability criterion was put under much pressure due to technological 
advances. At UNCLOS III it became apparent that the technological advances had made the 
depth and exploitability based definitions obsolete.103 The new nature of the definition of the 
continental shelf was agreed upon at the third session of UNCLOS III and included an article 
which eventually appeared as Article 76(1). 
 The LOS Convention provided a more expansive definition of the continental shelf 
which was an advantage to the states. The new provisions replaced the fluid delimitation 
criterion of exploitability and introduced a more objective approach to maritime delimitation. 
Article 76 includes different methods of delineating the outer continental shelf providing 
different formulas which the states are at liberty to choose for themselves. Article 76 of the 
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LOS Convention is considered to have become part of customary international law.104 The 
next sections will examine some of the factors which speak against the viability of the 
Norwegian argument. 
 
3.2.4 Regime of Islands 
 
All islands are entitled to a territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive fishing zone/EEZ.105 
This right is also current in article 1 of the Geneva Convention.106 There is nothing in the 
Svalbard Treaty that expressly prohibits Svalbard from generating maritime zones and it 
follows that Norway has the competence to establish maritime zones around Svalbard.107 The 
right Norway has to claim maritime zones around Svalbard does not appear to be questioned 
by any state (except for Russia which has protested against the legal basis for establishing the 
200-nm zone.108) The only exception to this is that rocks which cannot sustain human life 
should not be used as basis for generating maritime zon s.109 If Svalbard had many of these 
types of islands, there would not be enough basis for the generation of maritime zones. 
However, most of the islands are so close to the archipelago that in practice the generation of 
the continental shelf would not be affected.110  
 Even if islands may generate their own maritime zones, the situation in relation to 
Svalbard is such that the archipelago and the mainland are under the sovereignty of the same 
state. Since the seabed is legally continental shelf, which is established, the rule that islands 
generate their own maritime zones is of little practical consequence.111 However, in the case 
of Svalbard there are two sets of legal rules which ave different areas of application. The 
rules of the 1982 LOS Convention apply to all sea areas around Svalbard, while the Svalbard 
Treaty, in the view of Norway, is restricted to land and sea territory.112 In this case, where the 
island and the mainland are subject to two different l gal regimes, the rule that islands 
generate maritime zones becomes crucial.113 The two geographical areas are thus subject to 
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different legal regimes and have different juridical haracter and the conclusion based on this 
is therefore that Svalbard has its own continental she f.114 
 
3.2.5 Reception by Other States 
 
Other states have either protested against the Norwegian view or reserved their position. 115  
The USSR/Russia protested against the Norwegian position as early as in 1970, contending 
Norway did not have any authority over the continental shelf pertaining to Svalbard.116 The 
Russian view that Norway may not unilaterally establish maritime zones around Svalbard has 
been supported by two Russian professors who argue that the status of the waters beyond the 
territorial sea is high seas.117Other states support the notion that Svalbard does generate 
maritime zones, but disagree on whether the provisins of the Svalbard Treaty apply to the 
maritime zones beyond the limit of the territorial sea.118 
The United Kingdom is among the states that claim the Svalbard Treaty applies to the 
“Svalbard Shelf”119 The British view was uttered by Baroness Young in the House of Lords 
on behalf of the British Government in 1986: ”In our view, Svalbard has its own continental 
shelf, to which the regime of the Treaty of Paris applies. The extent of this shelf has not yet 
been determined.”120 
Canada and Finland are the only two countries that have signaled support for the 
Norwegian position. The Canadian support is found in the preamble of an agreement that has 
not come into force: Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the 
Government of Canada on Fisheries conservation and enforcement (30 June 1995). This is an 
indication that the Canadian support is not effectuated.121 Finland withdrew their support from 
1987 at the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 2005.122 
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The most obvious controversies in terms of public coverage has related to activities in the 
Exclusive Fisheries Zone with incidents such as the seizing of the Russian trawler vessel 
Elektron in 2005 and the seizing and prosecution of tw  Spanish trawlers Olazar and Olaberri 
2004. These incidents led to Spain and Russia coordinating their position. These are examples 
of what Pedersen indicate is a coordinated opposition that evolved during the early 2000s.123 
Several countries have threatened to take the case to th ICJ and the United Kingdom claimed 
that opposing position would “find strong support in international law” should it ever be 
referred to the Court.124 However, these threats remain empty even today. The next section 
will examine the legal basis for the Norwegian claim and provide a discussion on the 




The original Norwegian position was based on the law of the sea as it was set by the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. As mentioned before, there had until 1962 been 
little interest in the continental shelf of Norway. This was based on lack of technological basis 
for uncovering the resources on the shelf and an uncertainty of whether Norway had any 
significant shelf at all. This uncertainty was based on the criteria set by the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf’s 200-metre depth criterion. The Norwegian Channel only goes down to a 
depth of 200 meters, and lies fairly close to the sore. The Barents Sea is also very shallow 
with only 450 meters depth at its deepest between Northern Norway and Svalbard.125  The 
Channel was, however, not of any legal inconvenience to Norwegian sovereignty and its 
extension beyond the Channel as this was set down by the Geneva Convention; As long as it 
was possible to exploit the resources in such a manner that it did not infringe on the claimed 
jurisdiction of other states as set by the equidistance line, Norwegian jurisdiction could not be 
precluded beyond the Norwegian Channel.126  
 Another requirement as set out by Article 1 of the Geneva Convention in determining 
the extent of the continental shelf is that the areas under question should refer to areas 
“adjacent to” the coast and coastal areas. The concept of “natural prolongation” will also take 
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effect in determining the matter at hand.127According to the Geneva Convention, the 200-
meter depth criterion and the exploitation criterion are the two alternatives for determining the 
extent of the continental shelf. As a consequence of t chnological improvement, states have 
claimed larger areas under their jurisdiction. This is referred to as “creeping jurisdiction”. 
This problem was dealt with during the third conference on the law of the sea from 1973-
1982. The exploitation criterion was considered to be an insufficient criterion to determine the 
breadth of the continental shelf, and Article 76 provides for the new definition of the 
continental shelf.  
 The guidelines provided for in the 1982 Framework are more technical than the 
flexible definition of the Geneva Convention upon which the state could choose the option 
which suited them best. The new frameworks allows for this to the degree that the state can 
freely choose which of the four formulas to combine when establishing the limits of the 
continental shelf up to 200 nm from the baselines. This is a far more extensive method of 
delimitation and establishment than that the Geneva Convention can provide for and 
considering that most of the LOS Convention has pased into customary law, this precludes 
the application of the 1958 Geneva Convention in these matters. The Norwegian viewpoint 
therefore does not seem to be viable according to the modern law of the sea.  
 
                                                
127 Ibid. p. 15. 
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3.3 Has the Norwegian Position Changed? 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
This subchapter aims at identifying the incidents that indicate that there has been a change in 
the Norwegian viewpoint. There are some indicators t  this: The bilateral delimitation 
agreements with Denmark and Russia were based on basepoints from Svalbard. The process 
of establishing final outer limits of the Norwegian continental shelf is also indicative of a 
change in position. This first section aims at mapping out the legal basis for maritime 
delimitation and to uncover which legal basis Norway h s invoked for its respective 
delimitation agreements with Denmark and Russia. As will be argued, case law provides that 
the first point in establishing maritime boundaries is to identify basepoints upon which the 
delimitation lines will be based. The suggestive conclusion is that Norway has employed 
basepoints based on the coasts off Svalbard’s western coast in the agreement with 
Denmark/Greenland and off the eastern coasts of Svalbard in the agreement with Russia. The 
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf also shows that Svalbard has been 
used as basis and will be discussed last.  
 
3.3.2 Establishment of Maritime Delimitation Boundaries 
 
The object of delimitation of the continental shelf betweens states is to achieve an equitable 
solution.128 The LOS Convention does not provide for an exact method of delimitation other 
than referring to the principle of equity. It is the case law which provides guidelines for the 
method of delimitation, commencing with the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases.129 The 
ICJ determined in this case that the Geneva Convention did not apply to maritime boundary 
delimitation between two states and therefore sought out to determine the relevant customary 
international law for delimitation. From this point of view, the 1958 Geneva framework upon 
which Norway bases its position on is not well suited o defend the view that Svalbard does 
not generate a continental shelf. The difference betwe n the method of delimitation from the 
1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 LOS Convention is that while the former made a clear 
technical distinction between opposite and adjacent states and reliance upon equidistance , the 
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latter applies international law as reflected in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute in order to reach an 
equitable solution. 
 However, the difficulty in determining the proper application and interpretation of 
treaty law to boundary delimitation issues were highlighted in the 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen 
case between Denmark and Norway.130 The court commented that this was the first time it 
had to apply the Geneva Convention as a matter of treaty law, but at the same time noted that 
any interpretation of the convention would require a consideration of customary international 
law.131 
 Case law does however prove that a stronger emphasis on the LOS Convention has 
evolved and the emphasis on ‘natural prolongation’ from the Geneva framework has now 
been replaced with the view that geomorphologic criteria have less significance under the new 
framework of LOSC Article 76.132 Article 76 grants all states a minimum of 200 nm 
continental shelf where technically possible.133 The combined jurisprudence of case law, state 
practice and delimitation methods as laid down by the LOS Convention, it is today possible to 
distinguish a method for maritime boundary delimitation.134 
 In the 2009 Black Sea case,135 the court for the first time referred to a delimitation 
methodology.136 This approach involves three stages. The first is to establish a provisional 
delimitation line. In the case of opposite states such as is the case with Svalbard and 
Greenland/Russia, a median line is applied.137 The second element is to consider whether 
there any factors that call for an adjustment of the provisional line in order to achieve an 
equitable result.138 The final stage after making any adjustments to the provisional line is to 
verify in court that the line does not lead to an inequitable result “by reason of any marked 
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the 
relevant maritime areas of each State by reference to the delimitation line.”139  
 Now that the legal basis and method for maritime delimitation is established, a 
consideration of the methods used in Norway’s bilateral delimitation agreements is in order.  
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3.3.3 Norway-Denmark Delimitation Agreement 
 
The first step in establishing maritime boundaries, as reflected above, is to identify the 
baselines on the headlands and outermost islands from which to construct a provisional 
equidistance line.140 The baselines of Svalbard were established in 2001.141 The new baselines 
included the whole island and covered the eastern coast of Svalbard which had been 
postponed due to harsh natural conditions in the area.142 The baselines of Greenland were 
established in 2004. Prior to this there had been an undefined agreement to delimit the area 
between the eastern coasts of Greenland and the west rn coasts of Svalbard by applying a 
median line without any precise specification of the points of delimitation, but based on a 
median line.143 The Agreement sought to establish these points.144  
 The preamble of the Svalbard-Greenland Delimitation Agreement145 pointed out that 
the delimitation did not affect the final delimitaton of the outer limits of the continental shelf, 
which the parties would turn to at a later point. The Agreement seems to be based on the 
“method of equidistance between the nearest basepoints in Greenland and Svalbard.”146 The 
Agreement delimits the continental shelf and the EEZ of Greenland and FPZ of Svalbard 
within 200 nm.147 
 According to the Norwegian view, the delimitation in this area should be based on 
basepoints extending from the mainland, but as we hav  seen, these point lie not on the 
mainland of Norway, but off the western coast towards Greenland.148 This is a clear indication 
that Svalbard generates its own maritime zones.  
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3.3.4 Norway-Russia Delimitation Agreement 
 
When the Agreement between Norway and Russia on the Delimitation in the Barents Sea was 
signed, it ended a 40 year long negotiation over an undelimited area which covered 175,000 
km2.149 The first basepoint of the new agreement starts at the mouth of the Varangerfjord and 
corresponds with the last point of the 2007 Varangerfjord Treaty.150 The original agreement151 
which was extended on an annual basis from 1957 was based on the 1958 Geneva Convention 
to which both states were parties. Article 6 established that the boundary should be based on a 
median line unless there were any “special circumstances” present that justified another 
boundary.152 The states later became parties to the LOS Convention, making articles 74 and 
83 the applicable provisions to determine delimitation. Both states, however, maintained their 
original views on delimitation according to the reading of Article 6 of the Geneva 
Convention. Norway claimed that there were no special circumstances and thus claimed an 
application of the median line while Russia asserted a sector line as basis for delimitation on 
the basis that there existed special circumstances.153  
 The 2010 Treaty established a single delimitation line154 based on “international law in 
order to achieve an equitable solution.”155 The parties have taken relevant case law into 
consideration and refer among others to the Black Sea case. There were no special 
circumstances taken into account, but the joint statement refers to “relevant factors” including 
“the effect of major disparities in respective coastal length”. None of the official Norwegian 
documents produced in relation to the Agreement seem  to specify the procedure or basis for 
determining the basepoints upon which the (delimitation points) are based. Reference is made 
to the delimitation line specified by geodetic lines drawn through points of coordinates. 
 The assumption that follows is that the points of coordinates are based on basepoints 
derived from Svalbard. The final baselines on Svalbard were established in 2001 and 
established basepoints on Spitsbergen, northwards around Nordaustlandet, Kvitøya, Kong 
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Karls Land and Hopen, Barentsøya and Edgeøya.156 The basepoints upon which the 
Norwegian-Russian delimitation Agreement seem not to be based on the Norwegian 
mainland, but rather off the coasts of Hopen, Kong Karls Land and Kvitøya towards the 
nearest basepoints in Russia.157 This is another example that indicates that there as been a 
change in the Norwegian position and proves that Svlbard generates its own maritime zones 
by basing the delimitation on basepoints derived from Svalbard.  
3.3.5 Conclusion Maritime Delimitation 
 
As previously established, the development in international law regarding maritime 
delimitation has shown that the emphasis on geomorphologic criteria have less significance 
under the framework of the LOS Convention. Even Norway sought a solution to the problem 
the exploitation criteria involved as the boundaries for the continental shelves of states were 
in a process of constant dislocation in accordance with the fast developing technology. The 
anticipation was that UNCLOS would determine more precise and permanent criteria that 
would replace the exploitation criteria.158 
 Norway uses Svalbard as basis for the median line delimitation of the continental shelf 
towards Greenland and Russia which indicates that the continental shelf around Svalbard 
generates a shelf of its own as opposed to constituting a part of the Norwegian mainland shelf 
as the delimitation would otherwise be based upon. The conclusion is therefore that by proof 
of these delimitation agreements, Svalbard generates its own continental shelf.  
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3.3.6 The Process of Establishing Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf 
 
As established, the right to establish maritime zones derives from the sovereignty of the 
coastal state over a territory.159 The process of determining the outer limits of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nm is unique in the sense that the stat  has to consult with the CLCS – The 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 160 - to be able to fix the limits.161 This 
process has to happen within 10 years of the entry i to force of the LOS Convention.162 By 
establishing these outer limits, the coastal State consolidates its sovereign rights over the 
natural resources of the continental shelf.163 The coastal State shall provide the Commission 
with relevant data which will enable the Commission t  make recommendations. The coastal 
State will then establish limits on the basis of the recommendations which will be “final and 
binding”.164 There is, however, a saving clause165 that excludes the binding effect on other 
coastal States with overlapping claims166.  
 Norway made its submission to the Commission in 2006,167 including a claim in the 
area of the Western Nansen Basin which extended more than 200 nm from the basepoints on 
the northern coast Nordaustlandet and 800 nm from the baseline of mainland Norway.168 The 
outer limits set by Norway in accordance with Article 76 of the LOS Convention are therefore 
not binding on the neighboring coastal States (Denmark in respect of Greenland and Russia.) 
The delimitation of overlapping claims is dealt with by Article 83 of the LOS Convention. 
The delimitation agreement between Denmark and Norway implies that Denmark recognizes 
Norwegian jurisdiction in the continental shelf are around Svalbard,169 and the same might 
be said for the Barents Sea delimitation agreement 
 In its submission, Norway asserted that the contine al margin in the three areas to 
which the submission was concerned (The Barents Sea “Loop Hole”, the Western Nansen 
Basin and the “Banana Hole” in the Norwegian and Greenland seas) comprised two parts.170 
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The largest part consists of the Eurasian Continental Margin into which Norway and Svalbard 
fall. This is in line with the original Norwegian position. In the Summary by the Commission, 
it is stated that there are two parts of the contine tal margin – that which pertains to mainland 
Norway and Svalbard in the east and that of Jan Mayen in the west. However, contrary to 
Norway’s claim that these areas constitute two separate parts, the recommendations summary 
notes that “…it appears evident that these two contine al margins link with each other via the 
Iceland-Faroe Ridge…”171 Despite this, the Commission chose to conduct its onsideration of 
data consistent with the “dual-margin approach” of N rway.172  
 The limits set by the coastal States are final and bi ing on other state parties to the 
LOS Convention.173 However, these limits are not binding “insofar they are challenged by 
other states.”174 States can dispute another states’ submission, but this was not the case in the 
Norwegian submission. However, four states reacted to the submission – Spain, Iceland, 
Denmark and Russia. None of these reactions disputed the right Norway has to establish 
maritime zones off Svalbard, but were unclear about the legal basis for this.175 Neither did 
they object to the fact that Norway suggested a contine tal shelf that extended beyond 81° 
latitude north as referred to in the Svalbard Treaty. The submissions of Iceland and Denmark 
contained no specific reference to a continental shelf off Svalbard. 
 Neither the Executive Summary nor the Recommendations Summary give any 
indication as to which basepoints Norway has used to base their outer limits on. There is also 
no reference as to whether the claim is based on Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard or if it 
is based on Norway’s sovereignty over the mainland in which the Svalbard archipelago 
constitutes a natural prolongation of the mainland. However, according to the submitted data, 
the claim extending beyond 200 nm in the Western Nasen Basin is stipulated on a basis of 
Svalbard’s baselines.176 Norway originally submitted two critical points ofdelimitation north 
of Svalbard, one of which were rejected at first but later accepted and extended farther 
northwards.177 This would not be possible if the basepoints extended from the Norwegian 
mainland as the outer limits of Norway’s continental shelf would have extended northwards 
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more than 800 nm miles from the Norwegian mainland coast. Norway considers its claims for 
the establishment of the outer limits beyond 200 nm to be in accordance with the provisions 
of LOSC Article 76 and thereby consolidating a new approach based on the 1982 LOS 




As has been shown, there have been several large developments in the law of the sea since the 
Geneva Convention, some of which relate to the arguments discussed above. The regime of 
islands introduced in the 1982 LOS Convention state that islands are entitled to their own 
maritime zones. Norway claims that the shelf around Svalbard falls under the 1963 Act on 
Submarine Resources. However, it is clear that the mainland and the Svalbard archipelago are 
subject to two different legal regimes with different juridical characters, and the conclusion 
must then be that Svalbard has its own continental shelf.  
 The original Norwegian argument was based on the provisions of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the CS. The argument is based on the otion that the seabed between Northern 
Norway and Svalbard in a natural prolongation of the landmass of the mainland. The 
sovereignty over the continental shelf around Svalbard thus follows from the sovereignty 
Norway has over the mainland and not Svalbard. They further argue that it is the exploitation 
criterion, and not the depth criterion which has most practical implication today. This is a 
doctrine which was developed during the 1960s and is clearly based on the framework of the 
Geneva Convention. According to article 76, it is hard to base the position on the article from 
1958 Norway has to adapt itself and its arguments to he modern international law, and the 
fact that Norway 1) stated that islands generate mariti e zones in the CLCS process and 2) 
used Svalbard baselines as basis for establishing outer limits, may be indicative of a change in 
view. 
 The legal status of the original Norwegian position seems to be weakened by the 
factors discussed above. Norway has the right to base its arguments on international law and 
case law, which they explicitly mention in the Barents Sea Delimitation Agreement. 
Subsequently to the delimitation agreements and the process of establishing outer limits of the 
continental shelf, however, there seems to have been a discrepancy between the Norwegian 
Svalbard policy and the actual state practice. In the delimitation and establishment of outer 
limits, Norway followed the legal framework of the1982 LOS Convention as it was hard to 
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base arguments in relation to new development on the 1958 Geneva Convention. This is 
indicative of the need Norway has to adapt its arguments to the new international law of the 
sea. 
 Both the delimitation lines and outer limits of the continental shelf are established to 
be based on basepoints measured from the coasts of Svalbard. There thus seems to be a 
distinction in the development of the Norwegian viewpoint with the process of establishing 
the outer limits of the continental shelf. The discrepancy between state policy and state 
practice is indicative that the Norwegian arguments no longer have legal currency as it is 
indicated that state practice differs from state policy. Norway therefore has a need to develop 
new arguments, and the new practice may be indicative that Norway accepts a new practice 
with legal basis in the LOS Convention. 
 
 37 





The previous chapter established that Svalbard generates a continental shelf and that the 
original Norwegian position seems to have changed in terms of state practice. There is, 
however, a discrepancy between state practice and st te policy that needs to evolve. One of 
the current issues is the status of the continental shelf should the Svalbard Treaty apply. As a 
consequence that Svalbard generates its own zones, it is implied that the legal framework is 
also extended to apply to the continental shelves. This chapter will examine some of the 
implications of this situation. 
 Pursuant to Norway’s position on the maritime zones around Svalbard, the general 
legislation of the continental shelf has been made pplicable to the continental shelf beyond 
the territorial sea of Svalbard.178 The 1963 Act on Submarine Resources was considered to be 
applicable to the continental shelf around Svalbard, and the 1996 Petroleum Law is 
considered to have the same application. It is, however, unclear whether Norway is entitled to 
apply these regulations to the Svalbard continental she f. 
 This chapter will first examine the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf 
related to exercise of jurisdiction and how this relat s to Svalbard. It will then go on to discuss 
the legal implications of the application of the Svalbard Treaty to the continental shelf related 
to the Svalbard Mining regulations and the principle of non-discrimination. 
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4.2 Rights of the Coastal State over the Continental Shelf 
4.2.1 Coastal State Jurisdiction on the Continental Shelf 
 
The coastal States enjoys sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting its natural resources.179 In the early process of codifying the rights 
and duties of states on the continental shelf, the ILC aimed at specifying that the rights 
accorded to states did not amount to sovereignty in such a way that the freedoms of the sea 
and the airspace above might be threatened. This gave w y for the concept of sovereign 
rights.180 These sovereign rights include not only the exclusive right181 to explore and exploit 
the resources of the seabed, but also the jurisdiction to prevent and enforce violations of the 
law.182 Coastal state jurisdiction will now be examined first before discussing it in relation to 
Svalbard. 
 Jurisdiction can be referred to as the “powers exercis d by a state over persons, 
property or events”183 By the time the third conference on the law of the sea convened 
(UNCLOS III), the provisions of the 1958 Convention  the Continental Shelf had passed 
into customary law,184 but there still remained unresolved issues.185  The concept of “common 
heritage of mankind” evolved and was discussed during the conference, which required a 
more solid definition of the outer limits of the continental shelf since the residual area would 
convert to the international seabed, an area outside national jurisdiction. According to LOSC, 
states were now entitled to a continental shelf that extended out to a distance of 200 nm 
regardless of whether their continental margin extended that far. Coastal states with margins 
beyond 200 nm would have sovereign rights and jurisdiction over this area out to a certain 
limit as set by the CLCS.  
The rights and duties of the costal state were not significantly altered by the LOS 
Convention from the Geneva Convention.186 Part VI of the LOS Convention regulates the 
continental shelf. The coastal state exercises over its continental shelf the sovereign right to 
explore and exploit its natural resources. The jurisdiction the coastal state can exercise over 
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the continental shelf is both territorial and extra-territorial in nature. The territorial 
jurisdiction includes the land, sea, air space and subsoil of a country’s territory. Extra-
territorial jurisdiction includes areas that need basis and recognition in international law such 
as universal port state jurisdiction, nationality principle of ships or universal principles. 
 
 
4.2.2 The Svalbard Treaty and the Exercise of Sovereign Rights on the Continental Shelf 
 
Svalbard can generate maritime zones which constitute parts of the Norwegian continental 
shelf and neither the Svalbard Treaty nor the LOS Convention prohibits this. There may, 
however, exist certain restrictions on how Norway cn exercise its sovereign rights in relation 
to prescribing laws and enforcing these. 
 In order to discuss the jurisdiction of a state in a certain territory, the sovereignty of 
this state must first be established. By virtue of Svalbard Treaty article 1, the Treaty parties 
recognize that Norway has the “full and absolute sovereignty” over the Svalbard Archipelago. 
According to the Svalbard Act, 187 section 1, Svalbard forms part of the Kingdom of Nrway 
and is subject to Norwegian sovereignty and jurisdiction with certain limitations. 188 The Act 
also describes the system of law on Svalbard. Section 2 of the Svalbard Act covers the scope 
of Norwegian legislation. Norwegian civil and penal law together with the legislation related 
to the administration of justice applies to Svalbard. Other statutory provisions apply only 
where this is specifically provided for.189 The latter provision, covered by section 2, second 
paragraph applies only to statutory provisions, which means other rules of law can be 
applicable.190 
 The Russian professors Vylegzhanin and Zilanov argue that Norway does not have the 
competence to unilaterally establish an EEZ or claim  continental shelf around the 
archipelago and thus assert that Norway does not have t e competence to take legislative and 
enforcement measures in areas beyond the territorial waters of Svalbard.191 However, full 
Norwegian sovereignty implies the right to make anddopt laws and regulations on Svalbard. 
According to the Svalbard Act, Norwegian legislation related to private and penal law etc. 
applies to Svalbard. This makes it clear that the principle of Norwegian legislative powers and 
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right to make decisions is valid on all areas where sp cific provisions do not provide 
otherwise.192 There is in practice no limitation on Norway for issuing statutory provisions. 
However, these provisions must be prescribed in such a manner that they do not discriminate 
between nationals and State treaty parties so that the treaty parties are in a worse off position 
than Norwegian nationals.193  
Although State treaty parties enjoy non-discriminatory rights to undertake different 
kinds of economic activities on the archipelago, Norway has jurisdiction to prescribe laws and 
regulations. The Svalbard Treaty Article 2 provides for the prescriptive jurisdiction of 
Norway, which enables her to prescribe nature conservation measures: 
 
Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the 
preservation and, if necessary, the reconstitution of the fauna and flora of the said 
regions, and their territorial waters…194 
 
Some states have asserted that contracting parties should be involved in the legislative process 
and that they have flag state jurisdiction to enforce the set regulations.195 This claim is not 
warranted for two reasons: it may conflict the regime prescribed by LOSC Article 61 which 
relates to the utilization of living resources and because Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty 
recognizes Norway’s sovereignty and thereby its competence to take and enforce measures to 
protect the environment and its natural resources.196  
 According to the Norwegian view, and as supported by Professor Fleischer, Svalbard 
is an integral part of the Kingdom of Norway and is subject to Norwegian sovereignty. This 
sovereignty is limited by specific provisions as set out by Articles 2-9 of the Svalbard Treaty. 
The next section will examine the consequences of the application of the Svalbard Treaty to 
the continental shelf adjacent to Svalbard. 
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4.3 Implications of the Application of  the Svalbard Regulatory Framework on Activities 




Different groupings of both international and national oil companies have for a long 
time put pressure on the oil industry and its operation on Svalbard. These companies would 
directly benefit from the application of the Svalbard Treaty to the continental shelf as it puts a 
restriction on the sovereignty of Norway.  
 The importance of mining on Svalbard was accentuated by the procedure set out by 
article 8 of the Svalbard Treaty on the adoption of the Mining Code. There is disagreement as 
to the legal status of the Mining Code which relate to whether the Code is binding as an 
international instrument or as a piece of Norwegian domestic legislation.197 This is important 
to establish as it determines whether Norway has the right to make changes to the existing 
mining regulations without the consent of other states. According to Article 8 of the Svalbard 
Treaty, Norway undertook to provide mining regulations and the article further laid down 
limitations as to the contents and preparation of these.198 
 This chapter will first discuss whether the current mining regulations of the Svalbard 
regulatory framework apply to offshore activities rlating to the exploitation of non-living 
resources. The adequacy of the existing framework will also be examined before discussing to 
what extent Norway can apply general Norwegian law to these activities on the continental 
shelf. A discussion on the non-discriminatory access as it is suggested that Norway may adopt 
supplementary regulations as long as these are not prohibited by the principle of non-
discrimination. 
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4.3.2 Svalbard Mining Regulations 
 
It is unclear whether the Mining regulations of theSvalbard regulatory framework apply to 
the modern offshore petroleum industry. Ulfstein argues that the Mining Code covers the 
activities of search, acquiring and exploitation of natural resources. Further, the Mining Code 
section 2.1 explicitly mentions mineral oils, which s ould leave no doubt that the Code 
applies to petroleum activities as well.199 Fleischer also holds that “mining” in Article 3 whic  
covers “all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations “…would seem to include 
oil.” 200 However, this does not establish whether the existing framework is adequate to 
regulate the modern offshore petroleum industry. 
 There are certain difficulties connected with the application of the Mining Code to the 
continental shelf such as the principle of first finder’s right and proof of discovery. The 
former would be hard to realize as traditionally according to the Mining Code, a discovery 
should be proved by handing in a sample along with other information.201 This is not possible 
for petroleum resources, and the working practice has been to submit seismic results of 
geological indication instead of a physical sample. It would not be expected of Norway to 
open up a field simply on the basis of a geological indication without taking into 
consideration environmental and relevant technical concerns.202 However, once a field is 
open, the first finder’s right would once again apply.203 This provides for a disorderly regime 
which is not very well suited to maintain important spects of petroleum exploration such as 
environmental protection measures. 
 The object and purpose of the Svalbard Treaty is here of importance as the application 
of the Mining Code to the continental shelf should be seen in light of this. As there are certain 
shortcomings to the Mining Code it would be possible to apply the Mining Code through 
either proper interpretation or amendment according to the procedures laid down by article 8 
of the Svalbard Treaty.204 
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4.3.3 To What Extent Can Norway Apply General Norwegian Law?  
 
Article 8(4) of the Svalbard Treaty provides that Norway had to present draft regulations to 
the other parties of the treaty. Should any of the parties object to the draft regulation, they 
would have to be adopted by an international commission consisting of a member from each 
of these states.205 However, during the negotiations Norway took a different approach and 
consulted the Treaty parties and underwent extensiv negotiations which prevented the 
occurrence of a formal objection.206 The Code was adopted by Royal Decree of 7 August 
1925 which means the Code is part of integral Norwegian law and may be amended by either 
a Royal Decree or an act passed by the Storting.207  
 If the Code were a treaty, it would be signed by all the Treaty parties. The Code is, 
however, not annexed to the Svalbard Treaty as an integral part of the Treaty like the 
regulations for dealing with claims to land on the archipelago.208 Fleischer holds that the Code 
is Norwegian legislation and thus not internationally binding.209 He also holds that there are 
no rules on the procedure to be followed in case there were to be any amendments to the 
mining regulations. Other authors on the other hand, ssert that the Code is internationally 
binding for Norway, in which case Norway would no be able to amend the regulations 
without the consent of other states.210  
 To this day, the Code has not been amended, although n 3 June 1996 the Norwegian 
Ministry of Industry issued procedures for obtaining claims to natural resources on the 
continental shelf by allowing for other means of proof than physical samples.211 As the 
current mining regulations are unsatisfactory to the technical development in the petroleum 
industry, this would serve as a restriction on Norway and its competence to issue new and 
modern regulations for the exercise of petroleum activity on the Svalbard continental shelf. 
However, these restrictions do not preclude the right to issue legislation to protect the 
environment.212 Further, a company claiming rights to carry out petrol um exploration and 
exploitation cannot demand that its activity be regulated by the Mining Code alone.213  
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 The Arctic is especially vulnerable to pollution, and an oil spill in these waters could 
potentially be devastating to the environment. Effects include operational discharges to the 
sea of environmental poison and petroleum and physical impacts on the seabed and on marine 
mammals as a consequence of seismic surveys.214 Norway has developed an integrated 
management plan for the Barents Sea, taking into acc unt its status as a valuable and 
particularly sensitive area. The Barents Sea Management Plan covers an area of 
approximately 1 400 000 km2, an area which includes Svalbard. As a consequence of the 
established sovereignty Norway has over Svalbard, it is competent to prescribe laws and 
regulations to the extent they are not prohibited by the non-discriminatory principles of the 





The Svalbard Treaty aims at prohibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality by 
maintaining the previous terra nullius rights on the archipelago.215 The principle of non-
discrimination as provided for by the Svalbard Treaty article 3(1), is a precondition for the 
other non-discretionary rights provided by the Svalbard Treaty:216 
 
The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and 
entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories 
specified in Article 1…217 
 
These activities are related to, but not limited to, the right to undertake maritime, industrial, 
mining and commercial activities. Mining activities include, as established, offshore 
petroleum activities relating to the exploitation of n n-living resources. 
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The rights the State parties enjoy are both full and limited. They enjoy the right of equal 
access and entry “for any reason or object whatever…” to the maritime areas and ports of 
Svalbard. However, the right to access the rest of the territories of Svalbard is subject to the 
relevant provisions regulating activities on the archipelago. These rights are specified in 
Article 2(1) and relate to hunting and fishing “in the territories specified in Article 1 and in 
their territorial waters”. Parties must also be allowed access to other parts of Svalbard which 
are not specifically mentioned in article 3(1) for such purposes.218 
Ulfstein concludes that the right of access and entry applies to the whole land territory 
of Svalbard and its territorial waters.219 However, as seen before, Norway has prescriptive 
jurisdiction which enables her to prescribe laws and regulations that will apply to Svalbard. 
Conservation measures related to hunting and fishing are covered by article 2(1) and 2(2). 
“Similarly”, measures to protect the nature against i dustrial, commercial and mining 
activities such as petroleum extraction are covered by article 2(2) and article 3(1) and (2).220  
Should the principles of the Svalbard Treaty’s article 8 and the Mining Code be made 
applicable to the continental shelf, companies would have the right to make claims to 
resources. The Mining Code provides that “[t]he right of searching for and acquiring and 
exploiting natural deposits of coal, mineral oils and other mineral rocks…” may be acquired 
“subject to the observance of the provisions of this M ning Code and on equal terms with 
regard to taxation and in other respects…”221 
In relation to the previous discussion, the question of right to mining licenses is raised 
on to which extent Norway is allowed to control acquisition of mining licenses. Norway in 
fact has a strict policy on this and held already in the first report on Svalbard that the 
Bergmester is not entitled to reject an application for a claim if the claimant has followed the 
proper procedures as set out by the Mining Code.222 The reference to the “right” and 
“demand” the Bergmester can set supports this view.223 The conclusion is therefore that 
Norway, in the power of the Bergmester, does not have unrestricted rights to reject companies 
from the contracting state parties mining licences. 
In relation to environmental protection which is pointed out throughout this thesis as being of 
vital importance to Norway, the restriction put on Norway and the Bergmester includes cases 
where the ability of a company to be able to exercis  effective control over their activity in 
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relation to environmental pollution is questionable. However, as established previously, 
Norway has the power to make amendments and apply regulations to protect the environment 
to the extent it does not contravene with the Svalbard regulatory framework. As established, 
the environment on Svalbard and the surrounding mariti e areas is under the protection of an 
extensive framework of provisions as provided for bth in the Svalbard regulatory 
framework, national Norwegian legislation and of course in all the international treaties and 
frameworks related to the protection of the environme t, including the LOS Convention. It 
should thus be concluded that the implications of the application of the Svalbard Treaty and 
its attached regulatory framework to the continental shelf will not cause an entirely disorderly 
regime in terms of environmental perspectives or on m re technical aspects related to the 






This thesis has provided an examination of the controversial issue of Svalbard and its legal 
history, its legal status and the implications of the legal framework on the exploitation of non-
living resources on the continental shelf off Svalbard as caused by the expanding petroleum 
industry in the far north.224 The original Norwegian position developed in the 1960s when 
discoveries of petroleum on the Norwegian continental shelf were established. Norway held 
that the Svalbard Archipelago constituted part of the natural prolongation of the continental 
shelf of mainland Norway. This is true in geological terms, but as established in this thesis, 
does not apply in legal terms. The Norwegian governm t stands by its original position, but 
as it has been shown, there is a discrepancy between state practice and state policy. This may 
be indicative of a change in position. 
 There has been uncertainty attached to the application of the Mining Code to maritime 
areas adjacent to Svalbard and this relies to a great extent on the unresolved question on 
whether Svalbard generates maritime zones itself. This thesis has sought to conclude that this 
is the case by examining the legal basis for the Norwegian position and its development 
according to the international law of the sea and also other factual circumstances such as 
maritime delimitation and the establishment of outer limits of the continental shelf. The two 
latter issues have also been conclusive evidence to onclude that the Norwegian position has 
changed, or at least is in a phase of transition as the original argument relied on the law of the 
sea as it developed in the 1950s and 1960s. The recent practice related to the establishment of 
outer limits and the use of Svalbard as basis for baselines in maritime delimitation may be 
indicative that Norway has accepted a change in position and is basing it on the modern 
international framework of the law of the sea which is necessary in order to deal with the 
many changes in climate and the development of technology. 
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It is clear that in the future, the issue of the legal status of the Mining Code will need to be 
resolved should the pressure to open op for activities related to exploitation of non-living 
resources on the Svalbard continental shelf increase. The result may be that the Code is 
considered to be an international treaty in which an international commission consisting of all 
Treaty parties would have to consent to an amendment. However, as Norwegian sovereignty 
and jurisdiction is established, any adapted rules would not be able to preclude Norwegian 
regulations on environmental protection. 
 Norway would still have the right to adopt environmental and safety regulations for 
petroleum activity on the shelf.225 Article 2 of the Treaty provides for the legislation of 
suitable preservation and conservation measures. Should the parties’ equal rights regime 
apply on the continental shelf, it could lead to a “too extensive oil activity, to the detriment of 
both environmental and strategic concerns.”226 Thus, even though other states may be allowed 
to undertake petroleum activities, Norway still has a right, or even a duty, to take into 
consideration these factors when regulating oil actvities. A reference here can be made to the 
preamble and article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty which clearly indicates the importance the 
drafters attached to the “peaceful utilization of Svalbard”.227 
 The issue of Svalbard and its maritime zones has long been disputed. The interest in 
developing the petroleum industry on the archipelago has put pressure on the need for 
resolving these issues. There does not seem to be any ch nce of reaching a satisfactory 
conclusion yet.228 The debate seems to have reached a stalemate as there has been few 
academic contributions the last few years. 
 This thesis has been very interesting to work with as there has been a need to establish 
long lines in terms of having to decide on the most important aspects of the history of 
Svalbard to present as it is so vast and limiting it to the bare minimum without compromising 
the necessary information the reader needs to be presented with. Also in terms of having to 
from this point of departure and venture into a new s ction of the Svalbard history which has 
not yet been explored as there still is no “solution” the various disputes on Svalbard. One of 
the challenges of this thesis is the limited amount of resources available in terms of quantity 
and length it presents. To examine the implication of the Svalbard Treaty and its attached 
framework to activities relating to exploitation of natural resources on the continental shelf is 
almost impossible in a thesis of this size as there could be several books published on the 
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subject. Some of the things this thesis does not discuss is therefore technical aspects related to 
the exploitation of petroleum resources such as the issue of “first finder’s right” according to 
the Mining Code, the system for obtaining licences and safety and work regulations. These 
are all interesting issues which deserve to be discussed in a more appropriate academic work 
of a greater size. 
 As for the solution to the disputes related to Svalbard, I will not make any qualified 
suggestions as this has previously been examined in detail by Churchill and Ulfstein.229 On 
the other hand, it should be emphasized that despite of the conclusion that there does exist a 
framework which is suitable to the degree it does not provide for an unruly regime in the case 
of the application of the Svalbard Treaty to the continental shelf, the constant pressure to open 
northern areas for petroleum exploration will require a more substantive legal framework in 
the future. * At the Arctic Frontiers Conference held in Tromsø, January 2013, Mr. Ulfstein 
stated that the issue of petroleum interests could trigger the dispute on Svalbard.230 How the 
situation will develop as foster a solution will have to depend on the existing framework and 
the recognition by Norway that they need to establish a legal position which is in accordance 
with the modern law of the sea and is robust enough to deal with the challenges the future of 
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Appendix I: The Svalbard Treaty (excluding Annexes) 
 
Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British overseas Dominions and 
Sweden concerning Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th February 1920.  
       The President of The United States of America; His Majesty the King of Great Britain 
and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the 
King of Denmark; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Italy; His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Majesty the King of Norway; Her Majesty the Queen of 
the Netherlands; His Majesty the King of Sweden,  
       Desirous, while recognising the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of 
Spitsbergen, including Bear Island, of seeing these t rritories provided with an equitable 
regime, in order to assure their development and peaceful utilisation,  
       Have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries with a view to concluding a Treaty to 
this effect:  
       The President of the United States of America:  
       Mr. Hugh Campbell Wallace, Ambassader Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the 
United States of America at Paris;  
       His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond 
the Seas, Emperor of India:  
       The Right Honourable the Earl of Derby, K.G., C.V.O., C.B., His Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris;  
       And  
       for the Dominion of Canada: The Right Honourable Sir George Halsey Perley, 
K.C.M.G., High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom;  
       for the Commomvealth of Australia:  
       The Right Honourable Andrew Fisher, High Commissioner for Australia in the United 
Kingdom;  
       for the Dominion of New Zealand:  
       The Right Honourable Sir Thomas MacKenzie, K.C.M.G., High Commissioner for New 
Zealand in the United Kingdom;  
       for the Union of South Africa: Mr. Reginald Andrew Blankenberg, O.B.E, Acting High 
Commissioner for South Africa in the United Kingdom;  
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       for India:  
       The. Right Honourable the Earl of Derby, K.G., .C.V.O., C. B.;  
       His Majesty the King of Denmark:  
       Mr. Herman Anker Bernhoft, Envoy Extraordinary nd Minister Plenipotentiary of H.M. 
the King of Denmark at Paris;  
       President of the French Republic:  
       Mr. Alexandra Millerand, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs;  
       His Majesty the King of Italy:  
       The Honourable Maggiorino Ferraris, Senator of the Kingdom;  
       His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:  
       Mr. K. Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of H.M. the Emperor of 
Japan at Paris;  
       His Majesty the King of Norway:  
       Baron Wedel Jarlsberg, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H.M. the 
King of Norway at Paris;  
       Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands:  
       Mr. John London, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H.M. the Queen 
of the Netherlands at Paris;  
       His Majesty the King of Sweden:  
       Count J.-J.-A. Ehrensvärd, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of H.M. the 
King of Sweden at Paris;  
       Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed 
as follows:  
Article 1.  
       The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognise, subject to the stipulations of the 
present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of 
Spitsbergen, comprising, with Bear Island or Beeren-Eiland, all the islands situated between 
10° and 35° longitude East of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude North, especially 
West Spitsbergen, North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island, Wiche Islands, Hope Island 
or Hopen-Eiland, and Prince Charles Foreland, together with all islands great or small and 
rocks appertaining thereto (see annexed map).  
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Article 2.  
       Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of 
fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters.  
       Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decre  suitable measures to ensure the 
preservation and, if necessary, the reconstitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and 
their territorial waters; it being clearly understood that these measures shall always be 
applicable equally to the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties without any exemption, 
privilege or favour whatsoever, direct or indirect to the advantage of any one of them.  
       Occupiers of land whose rights have been recognised in accordance with the terms of 
Articles 6 and 7 will enjoy the exclusive right of hunting on their own land: (1) in the 
neighbourhood of their habita tions, houses, stores, factories and installations, constructed for 
the purpose of developing their property, under conditions laid down by the local police 
regulations; (2) within a radius of 10 kilometres round the headquarters of their place of 
business or works; and in both cases, subject always to the observance of regulations made by 
the Norwegian Government in accordance with the conditi s laid down in the present 
Article.  
Article 3.  
       The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and 
entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories 
specified in Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry 
on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a 
footing of absolute equality.  
       They shall be admitted under the same conditi s of equality to the exercice and practice 
of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial ent rprises both on land and in the territorial 
waters, and no monopoly shall be established on any account or for any enterprise whatever.  
       Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may be in force in Norway, 
ships of the High Contracting Parties going to or coming from the territories specified in 
Article 1 shall have the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward 
voyage for the purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo going to or 
coming from the said territories, or for any other pu pose.  
       It is agreed that in every respect and especially with regard to exports, imports and transit 
traffic, the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties, their ships and goods shall not be 
subject to any charges or restrictions whatever which are not borne by the nationals, ships or 
goods which enjoy in Norway the treatment of the most favoured nation; Norwegian natiolals, 
ships or goods being for this purpose assimilated to those of the other High Contracting 
Parties, and not reated more favourably in any respect.  
       No charge or restriction shall be imposed on the exportation of any goods to the 
territories of any of the Contracting Powers other or more onerous than on the exportation of 
similar goods to the territory of any other Contracing Power (including Norway) or to any 
other destination.  
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Article 4.  
       All public wireless telegraphy stations established or to be established by, or with the 
authorisation of, the Norwegian Government within the erritories referred to in Article 1 shall 
always be open on a footing of absolute equality to communications from ships of all flags 
and from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, under the conditions laid down in the 
Wireless Telegraphy Convention of July 5, 1912, or in the subsequent International 
Convention which may be concluded to replace it.  
       Subject to international obligations arising out of a state of war, owners of landed 
property shall always be at liberty to establish and use for their own purposes wireless 
telegraphy installations, which shall be free to communicate on private business with fixed or 
moving wireless stations, including those on board ships and aircraft.  
Article 5.  
       The High Contracting Parties recognise the utility of establishing an international 
meteorological station in the territories specified in Article 1, the organisation of which shall 
form the subject of a subsequent Convention.  
       Convensions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions under which scientific 
investigations may be conducted in the said territories.  
Article 6.  
       Subject to the provisions of the present Article, acquired rights of nationals of the High 
Contracting Parties shall be recognised.  
       Claims arising from taking possession or from ccupation of land before the signature of 
the present Treaty shall be dealt with in accordance with the Annex hereto, which will have 
the same force and effect as the present Treaty.  
Article 7.  
       With regard to methods of acquisition, enjoyment and exercise of the right of owner ship 
of property, including mineral rights, in the territo ies specified in Article 1, Norway 
undertakes to grant to all nationals of the High Contracting Parties treatment based on 
complete equality and in confirmity with the stipulations of the present Treaty.  
       Expropriation may be resorted to only on grounds of public utility and on payment of 
proper compensation.  
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Article 8.  
       Norway undertakes to provide for the territoies specified in Article 1 mining regulations 
which, especially from the point of view of imposts, taxes or charges of any kind, and of 
general or particular labour conditions, shall exclude all privileges, monopolies or favours for 
the benefit of the State or of the nationals of anyo e of the High Contracting Parties, 
including Norway, and shall guarantee to the paid staff of all categories the remuneration and 
protection necessary for their physical, moral and intellectual welfare.  
       Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclusively to the said territories and shall 
not exceed what is required for the object in view.  
       So far, particularly, as the exportation of minerals is concerned, the Norwegian 
Government shall have the right to levy an export duty which shall not exceed 1 % of the 
maximum value of the minerals exported up to 100.00 tons, and beyond that quantity the 
duty will be proportionately diminished. The value shall be fixed at the end of the navigation 
season by calculating the average free on board price obtained.  
       Three months before the date fixed for their coming into force, the draft mining 
regulations shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the other Contracting 
Powers. If during this period one or more of the said Powers propose to modify these 
regulations before they are applied, such proposals shall be communicated by the Norwegian 
Government to the other Contracting Powers in order that they may be submitted to 
examination and the decision of a Commission composed f one representative of each of the 
said Powers. This Commission shall meet at the invitation of the Norwegian Government and 
shall come to a decision within a period of three months from the date of its first meeting. Its 
decisions shall be taken by a majority.  
Article 9.  
       Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the admission of Norway to the League of 
Nations, Norway undertakes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in 
the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the said territories, 
which may never be used for warlike purposes.  
Article 10.  
       Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a Russian Government shall 
permit Russia to adhere to the present Treaty, Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy 
the same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties.  
       Claims in the territories specified in Article 1 which they may have to put forward shall 
be presented under the conditions laid down in the present Treaty (Article 6 and Annex) 
through the intermediary of the Danish Government, who declare their willingness to lend 
their good offices for this purpose.  
       The present Treaty, of which the French and E glish texts are both authentic, shall be 
ratified.  
       Ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as oon as possible.  
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       Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe may confine their action to 
informing the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative at 
Paris, that their ratification has been given, and in this case, they shall transmit the instrument 
as soon as possible.  
       The present Treaty will come into force, in so far as the stipulations of Article 8 are 
concerned, from the date of its ratification by all the signatory Powers; and in all other 
respects on the same date as the mining regulations pr vided for in that Article.  
       Third Powers will be invited by the Government of the French Republic to adhere to the 
present Treaty duly ratified. This adhesion shall be effected by a communication addressed to 
the French Government, which will undertake to notify the other Contracting Parties.  
       In witness whereof the abovenamed Plenipotentiaires have signed the present Treaty.  
       Done at Paris, the ninth day of February, 1920, in duplicate, one copy to be transmitted to 
the Government of His Majesty the King of Norway, and one deposited in the archives of the 
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